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Abstract
This article is aimed at exploring the implications of the introduc-
tion of self-control and temptation motives in inter temporal preferences
within an elementary competitive equilibrium with production. Letting
heterogeneous agents differ from both their discounting parameters and
their temptation motives, this article is interested in the long-run dis-
tribution of consumptions and wealths. Results are at odds from the
ones obtained in a standard Ramsey benchmark setup in that long-run
distributions are commonly non degenerated ones.
Keywords: Impatience, Temptation, Self-Control, Ramsey’s Conjecture.
JEL Classification: E, O.
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I. Introduction
Within a breakthrough contribution, Gul & Pesendorfer [4] has come to introduce a new
model of inter temporal choices based upon preferences with an interaction between a
temptation motive directed towards immediate consumption and a long-run concern that
springs from the discounting the future. More explicitly, they built a new axiomatisation
of preferences mainly based upon three distinct assumptions. Firstly, preferences will not
only depend upon the actual consumption sequences, but also upon the set of all admissible
trajectories. Secondly, a set betweeness axiom pictures a preference for commitment and
self-control. Finally, resting upon an axiom of temptation for an immediate consumption
plus a list of more standard axioms, a new temptation-based representation theorem for
preferences is established. More explicitly, for xt that denotes the quantity of wealth held
by an individual agent and ct that denotes his consumption, letting Bt(xt) feature the set
of reachable levels of consumption and wealth along: (ct, xt+) ∈ Bt(xt), preferences are
then to be represented through a function Jt that satisfies:
Jt(xt) := max
(ct,xt+)∈Bt(xt)
{
u(ct) + γv(ct) + δJt+(xt+)
}
− max
(ct,xt+)∈Bt(xt)
{
γv(ct)
}
,
for δ ∈ ], [ the discounting parameter and γ >  the temptation parameter. Through
his very choice, an agent will complete an arbitrage between his long-run welfare and
the short-run temptation of a maximal amount of immediate consumption. It is worth
emphasizing that, with respect to the standard model of inter temporal choice, the Gul and
Pesendorfer model introduces a function v(·) and a parameter γ that will jointly illustrate
the temptation motives of the agent.
This contribution considers a basic model with heterogenous individuals where preferences
are defined through similar functions u(·) and v(·), but differ from the parameters δ and γ.
It will then specialize the analysis to a comprehensive account of the long-run distributions
of consumption and wealth. In this regard, it is to be recalled that the decentralized
formulation of the standard growth model with heterogenous agents has been the core
of numerous contributions dating from the seminal article of Ramsey [9]. The so-called
associated Ramsey’s conjecture, that was formally established by Becker [1], introduces
the following result. Within a model with infinitely-lived agents that differ through their
discount rates, only the most patient of the agents benefits from a positive long-run amount
of consumption, the other agents being constrained to have nil levels of consumption.
Capital therein corresponds to a modified golden rule defined from the discount factor
of the most patient amongst the agents. Further, solely the most patient of the agents
is to hold a long-run positive amount of consumption. The Ramsey [9] model was then
augmented by Becker [1], Le Van & Vailakis [6] and Mitra & Sorger [7] through the
introduction of imperfect financial markets that single out the impossibility of indebtedness
for the individuals. Within such an augmented framework, the most patient amongst
the agents holds the whole stock of capital of the economy and benefits from a level of
consumption that exceeds his wage payments. In contradistinction with this, all of the
other agents have a level of consumption that boils down to their wage payments and
do not hold any capital units. Finally, the level of the capital stock results from the
modified golden rule that corresponds to the discount rate of the most patient amongst
the agents. For both of these cases, the model eventually leads to degenerated distributions
of consumption and wealth.
i 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.81
Under the assumption of a Gul and Pesendorfer’s class of preferences for the agents, the
long-run features of the heterogenous agents reveal as being strongly modified. First, un-
der a configuration with perfect financial markets and even though they differ from their
discount rates, all of the agents may display long-run positive levels of consumption. Inter-
estingly, under a configuration where their temptation motives will be lower than the one
of the most patient agent, their levels of long-run consumption could even overcome the
one of the benchmark individual. Considering then an economy with imperfect financial
markets, this results in a direct modification of the preferences of the agents. The maxi-
mum attainable level of consumption by individuals who succumb to temptation is indeed
accordingly modified. In the long run, constrained agents will consume their wage whilst
the unconstrained agents will benefit from a greater level of consumption. The very fact
of being constrained depends upon both the discounting and temptation parameters. As a
simple illustration, would the most patient amongst the agents be equally associated with
an exceedingly big level of temptation motives, he could well end up as being constrained.
To sum up, this simple economy with a Gul and Pesendorfer’s class of preferences for the
heterogeneous individuals will result in much more satisfactory long-run properties, the
distributions of consumption and wealth being far less degenerated than in the standard
case.
The whole model is specified with a variable degree of imperfection of the financial markets
that can be represented through a parameter λ, for λ =  that corresponds to perfect
financial markets whilst λ =  corresponds to the prohibition of any debt. Between these
two extreme values, one is then in position to represent a whole range of intermediary
scenarios with a limited indebtedness for all of the agents. One can prove that increasing
the imperfection of financial markets results into an increase of the long-run stock of
capital. Similarly, the long-run capital stock commonly increases with the level of patience
of the agents but decreases with their temptation motives. A final part is devoted to the
characterisation of the social optimum of the economy. For the optimum, it is always
preferable to cancel out the temptation motive. This interestingly results in the fact that,
considering a decentralization of such an optimum, it will always be necessary to constrain
the level of consumption of the individuals in order not to exceed the optimum level. It
is further proved that the imposition of such a constraint, together with a redistribution
of the initial wealths, suffices for decentralizing this optimum. Within a world where
individuals are subject to temptation motives, the only way to decentralize the optimum
is then to forbid the freedom of the consumption choice. The optimality is recovered from
one of the first very principles of communism: to anyone according to his needs.
Section II introduces the benchmark framework and completes the definition of the equi-
librium. Section III characterizes the long-run equilibria with and without financial con-
straints. Section IV analyses the comparative statics properties and studies some welfare
topics.
II. General Equilibrium of an Economy with Heterogeneous
Agents
II.1 A Setup and a Class of Preferences
Time is discrete. Consider a competitive economy with n infinitely-lived individuals in-
dexed by i = , , . . . , n. Let then {cit}t> denote the sequence of the consumptions of
ii 
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individual i = , , . . . , n whilst {wt}t> and {Rt}t> respectively stand for the wage and
gross interest rates sequences he faces to, for Rt =  + rt, where rt denotes the rate of
interest. Let then xit denote the wealth held by the agent i at date t > , xit = Rtait + wt,
where ait features the capital held at date t > . His budget constraint eventually writes
down at date t >  along:
xit+ = Rt+
(
xit − cit
)
+ wt+
An individual agent is further subject to an inter temporal budget constraint that is
defined over his lifespan. Assuming that ∑+∞t= wt/∏tτ= Rτ 6 +∞, his discounted future
human wealth at date t >  is hit+ =
∑+∞
j= wt+j/
∏j
τ= Rt+τ and happens to be the same
for any agent i = , , . . . , n. The lifespan budget constraint of an agent i = , , . . . , n
will eventually formulate along
ci +
+∞∑
t=
(
cit
/ t∏
τ=
Rτ
)
6 xi + h,
for h that denotes his discounted future human wealth by the initial date. The agent will
further face at any period a financial constraint:
cit 6 xit + λht+, λ ∈ [, ].
Within the above expression, λ denotes the fraction of human wealth that the agent may
consume. The occurrence of λ =  will then correspond to the omission of any liquidity
constraint and perfect financial markets: an agent will be in position to consume the
whole amount of his lifespan wealth. In opposition to this, the occurrence of λ =  will
correspond to a configuration for which the agent willn’t be allowed to borrow and face
imperfect financial markets.
Following Gul & Pesendorfer, the agent’s problem formulates according to:
Jit
(
xit
)
= max
cit ∈ [, xit + λht+],
xit+ = Rt+(xit − cit) + wt+
{
u
(
cit
)
+ γi
[
v
(
cit
)− v(xit + λht+)]+ δiJit+(xit+)},
Assumption P1. For γi > , u(·) and v(·) are defined on IR+, of class C , with1 Du(ci) >
, Du(ci) < , Dv(ci) > , Dv(ci) > , Du(ci) + γiD

v(ci) <  for ci >  and where
limci→Du(ci) = +∞, limci→∞Du(ci) = .
Within the above formulation, the non-positive component γi[v(cit)−v(xit+λht+)] pictures
the welfare loss when one withstands the temptation of consuming the whole amount. It is
then worthwhile noticing that this component cancels out when the individual oppositely
succumbs to the temptation. The integration of the parameter γi >  in the preferences of
the individual allows for letting the weight of temptation vary whilst δi ∈ ], [ describes
the psychological discount factor. Otherwise stated, this class of preferences happens to
exhibit a dependency with respect to the maximal level of consumption. The introduction
of a liquidity constraint results in a direct modification of the preferences. Finally, it is
worth emphasizing that these preferences reformulate along:
+∞∑
t=
(
δi
)t{
u
(
cit
)
+ γi
[
v
(
cit
)− v(xit + λht+)]}.
1Du(c) := ∂u(c)/∂c.
iii 
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The consumer problem lists along:
max
{cit,xit+}t>
+∞∑
t=
(
δi
)t{
u
(
cit
)
+ γi
[
v
(
cit
)− v(xit + λht+)]}()
s.t. xit+ = Rt+
(
xit − cit
)
+ wt+,
 6 cit 6 xit + λht+,
xi given
Under Assumption P.1, the problem is concave as it builds from an objective function
that is concave as a function of ct and concave with respect to xit + λht+. The holding
of cit >  always prevails and the following conditions are thus necessary and sufficient for
optimality:
Du
(
cit
)
+ γiDv
(
cit
)
= δiμ
i
t+Rt+ + νit,(a)
μit = δiμ
i
t+Rt+ − γiDv
(
xit + λht+
)
+ νit,(b)
limt→+∞
(
δi
)t
μitx
i
t = ,(c)
for μit and νit that denote the shadow prices respectively associated with the constraints
xit+ = Rt+
(
xit− cit
)
+wt+ and cit 6 xit + λht+. Taking differences between the two first
equations delivers μit = Du(cit) +γi[Dv(cit)−Dv(xit+λht+)]. At some date t > , an agent
can be constrained or unconstrained. An unconstrained individual has a consumption level
cit that satisfies cit < xit + λht+ whilst νit =  prevails. In opposition to this, a constrained
agent by date t >  is singled out by a consumption level cit such that cit = xit + λht+
whilst νit >  .
It is further assumed that:
Assumption P2.  > δ > δ > · · · > δn.
This economy encompasses a competitive representative firm with a production function
F(Kt,Lt), for Kt the capital stock at date t >  that depreciates at the rate η ∈ ], [ and
Lt the quantity of labour at that same date. Any of the individuals inelastically offers /n
units of labour, so that the global amount that is offered summarises to . The average
wage at date t >  is hence available as wt = (/n)DLF(Kt, ) for any of the individuals.
Assumption T1. F(K,L) is a strictly increasing function that is concave, of class C ,
homogeneous of degree one and such that DKF(, ) = +∞, DKF(+∞, ) < η.
Under Assumption T.1, there exists a critical level of the capital stock ˆK such that
DKF( ˆK, ) = η, for ˆK that corresponds to the golden rule of accumulation.
II.2 Equilibrium
Definition II.1. An inter temporal equilibrium of the economy populated by the n agents,
i = , . . . , n, is defined by a sequence {cit, xit, ht,Kt, wt,Rt, μit, νit}t> such that, for any t > 
and for any i = , , . . . , n:
xit+ = Rt+
(
xit − cit
)
+ wt+,(a)
Du
(
cit
)
+ γiDv
(
cit
)
= δiμ
i
t+Rt+ + νit,(b)
iv 
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μit = δiμ
i
t+Rt+ − γiDv
(
xit + λht+
)
+ νit,(c)
limt→+∞
(
δi
)t
μitx
i
t = ,(d)
for νit > , cit = xit + λht+,(e)
for νit = , cit < xit + λht+,(f)
ht+ =
+∞∑
j=
wt+j∏j
τ= Rt+τ
,(g)
wt = (/n)DLF
(
Kt, 
)
,(h)
Rt = DKF
(
Kt, 
)
+ (− η),(i)
n∑
i=
xit − wt
Rt
= Kt.(j)
III. Long-Run Equilibrium of an Economy with Heterogeneous
Agents
III.1 Characterisation
Proposition III.1.— A stationary competitive equilibrium of the economy with het-
erogenous agents is characterized by consumption levels (c, c, . . . , cn) together with an
aggregate capital stock given by K, factor prices given by w and R, that satisfy
n∑
i=
ci = F(K, )− ηK,(a)
R = DKF(K, ) + (− η), w = (/n)DLF(K, ),(b)
(i) if γi
{
Dv((− λ)w)/Du((− λ)w)} > δiR− , then ci = (− λ)w;
(ii) if γi
{
Dv((− λ)w)/Du((− λ)w)} < δiR − , then ci satisfies ci > ( − λ)w and is
defined from
δiR
δiR− 
γiDv
(Rci − (− λ)w
R− 
)
= Du
(
ci
)
+ γiDv
(
ci
)
.()
The first population of individuals, described through Proposition III.1(i), are constrained
and their consumption is available as ci = (−λ)w. The second population of individuals,
described through Proposition III.1(ii), are unconstrained and their consumption satisfies
(). As assessed through the following statement, this results into a consumption function
ci = C(δi, γi,R, w, λ):
Lemma III.1.—[Unconstrained Consumption] Consider a stationary solution for the un-
constrained individual such that:
() γiDv[(− λ)w]
Du[(− λ)w] < δiR− .
(i) The equation () determines a unique stationary consumption solution ci =
C(δi, γi,R, w, λ) > (− λ)w.
v 
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(ii) The unconstrained stationary consumption ci = C(δi, γi,R, w, λ) is non-decreasing
in w, increasing in R and δi, decreasing in γi and non-increasing in λ. Moreover,
limR→+∞C(δi, γi,R, w, λ) = +∞.
(iii) For λ =  and with perfect financial markets, C(δi, γi,R, w, ) is independent of w.
It is noticed that, for perfect financial markets and λ = , the inequation () becomes
δiR > . The unconstrained individual consumption function C can be perceived as the
consumption resulting from a partial equilibrium argument with w and R exogenously
given.
III.2 An Economy with Perfect Financial Markets
This section will establish the existence and the uniqueness of the steady state when
financial markets are perfect.
Definition III.1. A stationary competitive equilibrium of the economy with heterogenous
agents and perfect financial markets is characterized by consumption levels (c, c, . . . , cn)
with an aggregate capital stock given by K, factor prices given by w and R that satisfy
n∑
i=
ci = F(K, )− ηK,
R = DKF(K, ) + (− η), w = (/n)DLF(K, ),
(i) if δiR > , then ci >  and is defined from ci = C(δi, γi,R, w, λ);
(ii) if δiR ≤ , then ci = .
Letting henceforward R(K) := DKF(K, ) + ( − η) and w(K) := DLF(K, ), the frontier
between constrained and unconstrained behaviours defines, for any agent i = , , . . . , n,
a value ˜Ki such that
R
(˜Ki) = /δi.
Agent i will then have a positive consumption for K < ˜Ki and a nil amount of consumption
for K > ˜Ki. At that stage, it is worth emphasizing that the ranking of the elements of
{˜K, . . . , ˜Kn} is a direct byproduct of the one associated to the δi, i = , , . . . , n under
Assumption P.2: ˜K > ˜K > . . . > ˜Kn. From Lemma III.1 and the expression of factor
prices R(K) and w(K), the stationary amount of consumption ci of agent i can be expressed
as a function of K along:
ci = C(δi, γi,R(K), w(K), )
= C (δi, γi,K, ).
Moreover, C being independent of w(K) under perfect financial markets and for λ = ,
this results in C that is a decreasing function of K for any K ∈ ], ˜Ki[.
Proposition III.2.— Under the previous set of assumptions:
vi 
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(i) there does exist a stationary competitive equilibrium for the economy characterized
by a value K∗ ∈ ], ˜K[ and it is unique;
(ii) letting j ∈ {, . . . , n} be such that ˜Kj+ 6 K∗ < ˜Kj , agents , . . . , j with bene-
fit from positive stationary consumption amounts ci = C (δi, γi,K, )whereas the
consumptions of agents j + , . . . , n will sum up to zero.
The following examples will show that the long-run distribution of consumptions and
wealths may display features that stringently differ from the traditional Ramsey setup.
Example III.1. Within an economy with perfect financial markets (λ = ) and for agents
that merely differ from their discount rate, the stationary distribution of wealth for the
individuals may be non degenerated. A simple example should illustrate this scope for such
a non-degenerated distribution. Assume that n individuals are characterized by different
discounting parameters δi, with δ¯ :=
∑n
i= δi/n that describes the average discount factor.
In order to simplify matters, it is further assumed that all of the individuals are characterized
by the same temptation parameter γ. It is finally assumed that u(c) = ln(c) and v(c) = c.
When the level of consumption of an individual is positive at a steady state, it is available as
ci = (Rδi−)/γ. The aim is then to build an equilibrium for which all of the individuals, even
though they differ from their discount rates, benefit from a positive amount of consumption.
Such an equilibrium satisfies
n∑
i=
ci = F(K, )− ηK,
for ci = (Rδi − )/γ and R = DKF(K, ) + (− η), or
n∑
i=
[(
DKF(K, ) + (− η)
)
δi − 
]
/γ = F(K, )− ηK,
that restates along:[(
DKF(K, ) + (− η)
)
δ¯− 
]
n/γ = F(K, )− ηK.
This equation has a unique solution K∗ < ˆK such that (DKF(K
∗
, )+(−η))δ¯ > . Consider
then δn := mini(δi). Under the holding of δn > δ`, for δ` that is defined from (DKF(K
∗
, ) +
( − η))δ` = , and even though they are characterized by distinct values of δi, all of the
agents benefit from a positive level of consumption.
Example III.2. Consider an economy with perfect financial markets that is populated by
two individuals such that δ > δ and γ > γ. Interestingly, one may exhibit stationary
states parameter configurations for which c < c, i.e., the most patient of the agents
will assume a lower amount of stationary consumption. Keeping, along Example III.1, on
retaining preferences described by u(c) = ln(c) and v(c) = c, the steady state value of the
capital stock does correspond to the unique solution of the following equation:
[
DKF(,K) + − η
] ∑
i=
δi
γi
−
∑
i=

γi
= F(K, )− ηK.
vii 
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Letting then b = ∑i=(/γi) and a = ∑i=(δi/γi) and let the values of γi, i = ,  be given.
Consider variations of δi, i = ,  that will leave unmodified the value of the coefficient a and
in turn result in unmodified values for the capital stock.
More precisely consider the variations of δ and δ around a value of δ = a/b and let δ = δ+x
for x > . One then infers δ from the holding of δ/γ = a− δ/γ, whence
δ/γ = δb− (δ + x)/γ
= δ/γ − x/γ.
The consumptions of the two individuals become available as:
c =
(
Rδ − 
) /
γ
=
[
R(δ + x)− 
] /
γ,
c =
(
Rδ − 
) /
γ
= R
(
δ/γ − x/γ
)− /γ.
Upon a variation of x, R will keep on assuming the same value, for K is unmodified. From
the expressions above and for x = , it is firstly obtained that c < c, that results from
δ = δ = δ and γ > γ. Similarly, for x >  and as long as x assumes sufficiently small
orders, one also recovers c < c in spite of the holding of δ > δ ; the most patient agent
will thus be associated with a lower consumption amount.
III.3 An Economy with Imperfect Financial Markets
This part establishes the existence of an equilibrium in the economy with imperfect finan-
cial markets.This proceeds from first characterising the frontier between constrained and
unconstrained behaviours. Consider, for λ 6= , the equilibrium value for K that corre-
sponds, for an agent i, to the frontier between constrained and unconstrained behaviors:
γiDv
(
(− λ)w(K)) = {δi[R(K)]− }Du((− λ)w(K))()
Lemma III.2.— [Frontier between the regimes] Letting ˜Ki be uniquely defined from
R( ˜Ki, ) = /δi :
(i)the equation () of the frontier between constrained and unconstrained regimes deter-
mines a unique solution K = ˇKi(δi, γi, λ), for
ˇKi(δi, γi, λ) ∈ ], ˜Ki[;
(ii) ˇKi(δi, γi, λ) increases with δi, decreases with γi and increases with λ, for
limλ→ ˇKi(δi, γi, λ) =
˜Ki.
Lemma III.2 allows for introducing n values ˇKi, the agents being henceforward ranked
according to the following order:
ˇK > ˇK > · · · > ˇKn.
In contradistinction with the previous section and the prevailing of λ = , the ranking of
the individuals as described by ˇKi, i = , , . . . , n depends upon both δi and γi. From
Lemma III.2, the following occurrences are available for the agent i:
— for K > ˇKi, ci = (− λ)w and the agent is constrained;
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— for K < ˇKi, ci > (− λ)w and the agent is unconstrained.
From a general equilibrium perspective and for a constrained individual, consumption
listing as
ci = (− λ)w = (− λ)DLF(K, )/n,
it emerges as an increasing function of K. It is noteworthy that the configuration λ =
 drastically simplifies matters in this regard in imposing ci =  for any constrained
individual.
Matters are more subtle for an unconstrained individual i whose consumption as a func-
tion of K is given by ci = C (δi, γi,K, λ) = C(δi, γi,R(K), w(K), λ). The expression
C(δi, γi,R(K), w(K), λ) being, from Lemma III.1, increasing as a function of R and non-
increasing as a function of w, the resulting effect of a variation of K on the agent’s con-
sumption is not determined. Nevertheless, and as this is assessed through the following
statement, the function C (δi, γi,K, λ)/w(K) is monotone decreasing as a function of K.
Lemma III.3.—[Equilibrium unconstrained consumption] Consider the function ξi(K) :=
C i(δi, γi,K, λ)/w(K):
(i) it is monotone decreasing as a function of K over ], ˇKi], with limK→Kˇiξ
i(K) = − λ;
(ii) the function ξi(K) tends to +∞ for K→ .
With imperfect financial markets, the establishment of the proof of the existence of a
stationary equilibrium will require an extra assumption on the production technology.
Assumption T2. [DKF(K, ) ·K− ηK]/[DLF(K, )] is bounded in a neighbourhood of .2
Proposition III.3.— [Existence of a stationary competitive equilibrium] Under the pre-
vious set of assumptions,
(i) there does exist a stationary competitive equilibrium for the economy characterised
by a value K∗ ∈ ], ˇK[;
(ii) letting j ∈ {, . . . , n} be such that ˇKj+ 6 K∗ < ˇKj , agents , . . . , j are unconstrained
and consume according to ci = C (δi, γi,K, λ) whereas the agents j + , . . . , n are
constrained and their consumptions are available as ci = (− λ)w.
With perfect capital markets, the consumption function was decreasing in K for all un-
constrained agents and cancels out for the constrained ones, a property that ensured the
uniqueness of the equilibrium. In opposition to this and with imperfect financial markets,
the uniqueness of the equilibrium cannot be established in the general case. Constrained
agents now have a consumption level ( − λ)w, that increases with K and results in the
non-monotonicity of aggregate consumption.
2This property holds for a Cobb-Douglas production function or for a C.E.S. production function when the
elasticity of substitution is greater than one. Indeed and for F(K, ) = Kα, α ∈ ], [, limK→[DKF(K, )K−
ηK]/DLF(K, ) = α/( − α) while limK→[DKF(K, )K − ηK]/DLF(K, ) =  for such a C.E.S production
function.
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Example III.3. The aim of this example is to establish how, within an economy populated
by two agents i = ,  and such that δ > δ holds together with γ > γ, the equilibrium
can be characterized by a configuration for which the relatively more patient agent  will be
constrained whilst the relatively more impatient agent  will not. Only the most impatient
of the agents will then be unconstrained. Letting again u(c) = ln(c) and v(c) = c, such an
equilibrium is to be characterized by a value K such that:
() − λ

DLF(K, ) +
[
DKF(K, ) + (− η)
]
δ − 
γ
= F(K, )− ηK
with a value of K such that:[
DKF(K, ) + (− η)
]
δ − 
γ
>
− λ

DLF(K, ),(a) [
DKF(K, ) + (− η)
]
δ − 
γ
<
− λ

DLF(K, ),(b)
where these two above inequations respectively pictured an unconstrained agent  and a
constrained agent .
In order to build such an equilibrium, one needs to let the analysis rest upon a value of K > 
such that K < ˜K, for ˜K that is uniquely defined by the holding of DKF
(˜K, )+−η = /δ.
Fixing then δ and δ, γ and γ are selected such that the equilibrium characterized by (),
(a) and (b) does correspond to K.
For that value of K, one selects γ such that:[
DKF(K, ) + (− η)
]
δ − 
γ
= F(K, )− ηK− − λ

DLF(K, ).
Such a value of γ exists since
F(K, )− ηK− − λ

DLF(K, ) =
 + λ

DLF(K, ) + K
[
DKF(K, )− η
]
> .
Indeed, by assumption, K < ˜K < ˆK, one obtains DKF(K, ) − η > . Further and for the
appropriate value of γ, (a) needs to be satisfied, or
− λ

DLF(K, ) +
− λ

DLF(K, ) < F(K, )− ηK.
The holding of this inequality boils down to the satisfaction of λDLF(K, ) + K
[
DKF(K, )−
η
]
> , that does prevail.
Finally, inequation (b) will always be satisfied through the selection of large enough values
for γ.
IV. Comparative Statics & Welfare Topics
IV.1 Comparative Statics
This section is aimed at understanding the dependency of the long-run equilibrium with
respect to the parameters δi, γi and λ.
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IV.1.1 The Configuration without Financial Constraints
For this configuration, the stationary state is unique and there exists ζ ∈ [, n] ∩ IN such
that, for any i > ζ, ci =  and for any i 6 ζ, ci > . Further and for any i 6 ζ, ci(K)
decreases as a function of K. The following equation
n∑
i=
C i
(
δi, γi,K, 
)
= F(K, )− ηK
then assumes a unique solution K∗ ∈ ], ˆK[, for ˆK defined from DKF( ˆK, ) = η. It is also
obtained that
K∗ ∈ ]K˜ζ, K˜ζ+[.
But the occurrence of the condition ci =  for i > ζ does solely proceed through the
parameter δi and is independent of γi as it corresponds to δiR ≤ . From the properties
of the function C i listed through Lemma III.1, the following list of comparative statics
results then becomes available:
Proposition IV.1.— Let λ = :
(i) consider an agent i = , , . . . , n such that i > ζ and ci∗ = , then any variation of his
degree of self-control γi does not have any effect on the equilibrium steady state;
(ii) consider an agent i = , , . . . , n such that i 6 ζ and ci∗ > , then either an infinites-
imal decrease of γi or an infinitesimal increase in δi both translate into a long-run
increase of the value of the capital stock.
IV.1.2 The Configuration with Financial Constraints
Consider the competitive equilibrium K∗ ∈ ], ˇK[ and assume that K∗ ∈ ] ˇKζ, ˇKζ+[, ζ ∈
[, n]. Then and for any i > ζ + ,
C i
(
δi, γi,K
∗
, λ
)
= (− λ)w(K∗)
and the associated individuals are constrained. In opposition to this and for any i 6 ζ,
C i
(
δi, γi,K
∗
, λ
)
> (− λ)w(K∗)
and the associated individuals are unconstrained.
Proposition IV.2.— Assume that, for any λ, the equilibrium is unique and let λ < :
(i) consider an agent i ∈ [, n] such that i > ζ: then an infinitesimal variation of his
degree of impatience δi or of his degree of self-control γi does not have any effect on
the equilibrium steady state;
(ii) consider an agent i ∈ [, n] such that i 6 ζ and ci∗ > , then either an infinitesimal
decrease of γi or an infinitesimal increase in δi both translate into a long-run increase
of the value of the capital stock;
(iii) an increase in λ reduces the equilibrium steady state value of the capital stock K∗.
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Proof: By definition, K∗ is a solution of the following equation:
F(K, )− ηK =
ζ∑
i=
ci(K) + (n− ζ)(− λ)w(K),
or H`(K) = Hr(K,γi, δi, λ), for i = , . . . , k. The uniqueness of the equilibrium steady state
ensures that
DKH
`(K∗)−DKHr(K∗, γi, δi, λ) > .
Taking then advantage of the independence of Hr(K,γi, δi, λ) with respect to γi and δi for
any i 6 ζ, this establishes (i).
The obtention of (ii) results from the occurrence of DδiC(δi, γi,R, w, λ) > ,
DγiC(δi, γi,R, w, λ) <  through Lemma III.1.
The obtention of (iii) in his turn results from the occurrence of DλC(δi, γi,R, w, λ) < 
through Lemma III.1. Q.E.D
The results of Proposition IV.2 have been reached through a uniqueness assumption for
the stationary state. It is worth emphasizing that, even without such an assumption,
the above results will have prevailed in a neighbourhood of λ = . Indeed, and for
λ = , DKH
`
(K∗)−DKHr(K∗, γi, δi, ) > , that establishes the robustness of the preceding
conclusions.
According to (iii), an increase in λ will result in a decrease of the long-run value of the cap-
ital stock K∗. From K∗ < K̂, this will in turn translate in a decrease of total consumption.
But this will not necessarily correspond to a decrease in the individual consumption of
any of the agents. For constrained individuals, consumption being given by (− λ)w(K),
it will decrease with a rise in λ. But, and for unconstrained individuals, this may result
into an increase of their consumption. The previously considered example that built from
u(c) = ln(c) and v(c) provides an enlightening illustration in this regard. The consump-
tion of an unconstrained individual being available as ci =
(
δiR− 
)
/γi, an increase in λ
that entails a decrease in K∗ will eventually translate into an increase in ci.
IV.2 Welfare & Optimality
This section will first introduce the social optimum and then illustrate how it can be
recovered trough a competitive equilibrium.
Assume that the economy is populated by n agents of parameters
(
δi, γi
)
where  > δ >
δ > · · · > δn. Letting (ζ, . . . , ζn) denote the welfare weights put on any of the n agents,
the program of the benevolent planer will then formulate along:
max
{cit,ωit}
n∑
i=
ζi
+∞∑
t=
(
δi
)t{
u
(
cit
)
+ γi
[
v
(
cit
)− v(ωit)]}
s.t Kt+ = F
(
Kt, 
)
+ (− η)Kt −
n∑
i=
cit,
cit 6 ωit, K given,
where ωit singles out the maximal admissible value for the consumption of agent i and
by date t > . The component of the planer’s objective v(cit) − v(ωit) being however
xii 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.81
limited to assume non-positive values as a result of the holding of the constraint cit 6 ωit,
the optimal solution will be associated with the uniform satisfaction of ωit = cit. The
benevolent planer’s program hence simplifies to the standard formulation of the optimal
growth problem:
max
{cit,ωit}
n∑
i=
ζi
+∞∑
t=
(
δi
)t
u
(
cit
)
(P)
s.t Kt+ = F
(
Kt, 
)
+ (− η)Kt −
n∑
i=
cit,
K given.
The optimal solution being denoted {ci∗t ,K
∗
t }, t > , from Le Van & Vailakis [6], it will
converge towards the stationary state of the modified golden rule (c∗, . . . , cn∗,K∗) such
that:
DKF
(
K∗, 
)
+ − η = /δ,
c∗ = F
(
K∗, 
)− ηK∗,
ci∗ =  for any i > .
It is then a standard argument to establish that a characterisation of the optimal trajectory
is available from the following statement:
Lemma IV.1.— The sequence {ci∗t ,K
∗
t }t> depicts an optimal solution to the problem (P)
if and only if there exists a sequence {χt}t> that satisfies, for any i = , , . . . , n and any
t > :
ζi
(
δi
)tDu(ci∗t ) = χt+,
χt = χt+
[
DKF
(
K∗t , 
)
+ − η],
K∗t+ = F
(
K∗t , 
)
+ (− η)K∗t −
n∑
i=
ci∗t ,
limt→+∞χtK
∗
t = .
The completion of a decentralization procedure for the first-best optimum will first rely
upon the selection by any date t >  of the maximal value that is reachable for a level
of consumption, i.e., ωit . The component v(cit) − v(ωit) being negative for cit < ωit, a
decentralization scheme will proceed from imposing ωit = ci∗t for any t > . It is then
noticed that this further corresponds to a sufficient condition to ensure the obtention of
the first-best optimum that will be associated with an appropriate redistribution of the
initial wealth of any of the individuals.
The establishment of the decentralization argument through Proposition IV.3 will first
proceed from a preparatory lemma.
Lemma IV.2.— The competitive economy with consumption constraints along cit 6 ci∗t is
fully characterized by sequences
(
cit, a
i
t,Kt, wt,Rt
)
t>
,
(
μit
)
t> and
(
νit
)
t> such that, for
any t > :(
δi
)t[Du(cit)+ γiDv(cit)] = μit+ + νit,
ait+ = Rtait + wt − cit,
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μit = μ
i
t+Rt,
limt→+∞μitait = , ai given,
νit =  for cit < ci∗t ,
νit >  for cit = ci∗t ,
Rt = DKF
(
Kt, 
)
+ − η,
wt = DLF
(
Kt, 
)
/n,
Kt =
n∑
i=
ait.
Proposition IV.3.— The social optimum can be decentralized by choosing at date t = 
the initial wealth ai of any of the agents—through a redistribution of the initial wealth—
and by imposing cit 6 ci∗t at any agent i ∈ [, n] and for any period t > .
Surprisingly enough, Proposition IV.3 results in a set of conclusions that advocates com-
munism. As soon as the agents are submitted to a temptation motive, the best admissible
policy will be to severe their freedom of choice in consumption by imposing a constraint
cit 6 ci∗t : any of the agents is to consume according to his actual needs.
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V. Proofs
V.1 Proof of Proposition III.1
The satisfaction of R = DKF(K, ) +  − η and w = DLF(K, )/n directly results form
equations (h) and (i) when they are considered at the equilibrium long-run steady state.
In parallel to this, the consideration of (g) allows for deriving h = w/(R−) whereas (d)
will hold for a stationary state. Equations (a), (b), (c), (e) and (f) will then allow for
obtaining Proposition III.1(i) and Proposition III.1(ii) through the following statement:
Lemma.— Consider the optimal solution:
(i) a stationary optimal solution for an unconstrained individual corresponds to station-
ary values ci and xi such that:
Rδi =
Du(ci) + γiDv(ci)
Du(ci) + γi
(
Dv(ci)−Dv(xi + λh)) ,
where
a/ xi = (Rci − w)/(R− );
b/ the satisfaction of ci < xi + λh boils down to ci > w(− λ) or γiDv[(− λ)w] <(
δiR− 
)
Du[(− λ)w];
c/ the existence of such a solution requires Rδi >  and implies R > ;
(ii) a stationary optimal solution for a constrained individual corresponds to stationary
values ci and xi such that
a/ ci = (− λ)w;
b/ xi = [R(− λ)w − λw/(R− );
c/ the existence of such a solution requires the holding of νi > , that writes down
along: γiDv((− λ)w) > (δiR− )Du((− λ)w).
Proof: (i) For an unconstrained individual, νit =  and from (b) and (c):
(*) Rt+δi
[
Du
(
cit+
)
+ γiDv
(
cit+
)− γiDv(xit+ + λht+)] = Du(cit)+ γiDv(cit).
Rearranging and considering stationary trajectories in (*), the conditions of the statement
become available.
(ii) The basic form of the condition νi >  lists as:
νi = Du(ci) + γiDv(ci)− δiμiR > ,
for μi = Du(ci) + γiDv(ci) − γiDv(xi + λh), ci = xi + λh, μi = Du(ci), that gives, merging
and rearranging, the condition of the statement. Q.E.D
Equation (a) then corresponds to the resource constraints of the economy. It is derived
by combining equations (j), (h), (i) and (a) when considered at the stationary state.
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Equation (j) allows for stating∑ni= xi = Rx+nw whilst, from equation (a),∑ni= xi(R−
) = R∑ni= ci − nw. Finally eliminating ∑ni= xi between these equations, it is derived
that:
(R− )K + nw =
n∑
i=
ci.
Making use of (h) and (i), equation (a) is recovered. Q.E.D.
V.2 Proof of Lemma III.1
Proof: (i) From (), the defining equation for a steady state consumption is available as:
Du(ci) + γiDv(ci) =
δiR
δiR− 
γiDv
[Rci − (− λ)w
R− 
]
,
a solution to the above equation such that c > (−λ)w is then sought for. It is worth noticing
that this conveniently restates as H`(ci, γi) = H
r
(ci, δi, γi,R, w, λ), where the simultaneous
occurrence of DciH
`
(ci, γi) <  and DciH
r
(ci, δi, γi,R, w, λ) >  first ensures that there
exists at most one solution. Dealing then with the existence issue and for ci → (− λ)w, it
is obtained that:
H`(ci,γi)→ Du[(− λ)w] + γiDv[(− λ)w],
Hr(ci, δi,γi,R, w)→
δiR
δiR− 
γiDv[(− λ)w].
From the previous assumption, γiDv[(− λ)w] < (δiR− )Du[(− λ)w], whence
H`((− λ)w,γi) > H
r
((− λ)w, δi, γi,R, w, λ).
Conversely and for ci → +∞, whereas Du(ci)→ , [Rci − (− λ)w]/(R− ) > ci as a result
of the occurrence of ci > (− λ)w. This eventually results in
H`(+∞,γi) < H
r
(+∞, δi, γi,R, w, λ),
whence the existence and uniqueness results for ci.
(ii) Looking then for some comparative statics properties, it first emerges that
DRC(δi, γi,R, w, λ) >  as a byproduct of DRH
r
(ci, δi, γi,R, w) < . Indeed
Sgn
[
DR
(Rci − (− λ)w
R− 
)]
= Sgn[ci(R− )− Rci + (− λ)w]
= Sgn[(− λ)w − ci]
< .
The establishment that DwC(δi, γi,R, w, λ) >  then results from DwH
r
(ci, δi, γi,R, w, λ) 6
, having noticed that, for λ = , this simplifies to DwC(δi, γi,R, w, λ) = . In the same
way, it is readily shown that DδiC(δi, γi,R, w, λ) >  and DλC(δi, γi,R, w, λ) <  are direct
byproducts of DδiH
r
(ci, δi, γi,R, w, λ) <  and DλH
r
(ci, δi, γi,R, w, λ) > . Finally, the
establishment of the occurrence of DγiC(δi, γi,R, w, λ) <  proceeds from the restatement
of the defining equation for stationary values for ci according to:
Rδi
Rδi − 
=
Du(ci) + γiDv(ci)
γiDv[(Rci − (− λ)w)/(R− )]
≡ G(ci, γi, w,R).(**)
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The function G(ci, γi, w,R) being decreasing as a function of both γi and ci, the occurrence
of DγiC(δi, γi,R, w, λ) <  is established.
The expression C(δi, γi,R, w, λ) being monotone increasing as a function of R, it assumes a
limit that is either finite or infinite. Firstly assuming that ` < +∞ and from equation (**),
it is obtained that:
 =
Du(`) + γiDv(`)
γiDv(`)
,
that is impossible for ` < +∞ and establishes ` = +∞. Q.E.D
V.3 Proof of Proposition III.2
Proof: (i)-(ii) In order to save on notations, one considers the function ci(K) as defined from:ci(K) = C
(
δi, γi,K, 
)
for K ∈
]
,
˜Ki
[
;
ci(K) =  for K > ˜Ki.
The existence of an equilibrium is associated to the one of a value of K such that:
F(K, )− ηK =
n∑
i=
ci(K).
Denoting this equation along H`
(
K
)
= Hr
(
K
)
, as /δ > , it is first obtained that
˜K < ˆK. The function H
`
(K) then emerges as being increasing over ], ˜K[. In opposition
to this, the function Hr(K) is decreasing over ], ˜K[ with H
r
(
˜K) =  and limK→H
r
(K) =
+∞. These properties ensure the existence and the uniqueness of K∗ ∈ ], ˜K[ such that
H`(K∗) = Hr(K∗). Q.E.D
V.4 Proof of Lemma III.2
Proof: (i)-(ii) Uniqueness is established from noticing that the L.H.S. of () is non-decreasing as
a function of K whilst the R.H.S. decreases as a function of K.
The existence argument in turn results from noticing that, for K→ ˜Ki,
γiDv
[
(− λ)DLF(K, )/n
]
→ γiDv
[
DLF( ˜Ki, )/n
]
> ,{
δi
[
DKF(K, ) + (− η)
]− }Du [(− λ)DLF(K, )/n]→ .
In parallel to this and for K→ ,
γiDv
[
(− λ)DLF(K, )/n
]
→ γiDv
[
(− λ)DLF(, )/n
]
,{
δi
[
DKF(K, ) + (− η)
]− }Du [(− λ)DLF(K, )/n]→ +∞.
Whence the existence result. Q.E.D
V.5 Proof of Lemma III.3
Proof: (i) From its very definition, ξi(K) is a solution to:
δiR(K)γi
δiR(K)− 
=
Du
(
ξiw(K)
)
+ γiDv
(
ξiw(K)
)
Dv
((
R(K)ξi − (− λ))w(K)/(R(K)− ))
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The L.H.S. of the preceding equation increases as a function of K whilst the R.H.S. may con-
veniently be reformulated along Hu(K, ξi)/H`(K, ξi). It is then remarked that Hu decreases
with K whereas H` increases with both K and ξi,
[
Rξi − (− λ)
]
/
(
R− 
)
being indeed a
decreasing function of R, whence the monotonicity property for ξi.
(ii) The function ξi(K) being decreasing monotone as a function of K, its assumes a limit at
zero that is either ` >  or +∞. Assuming first that it is finite and limK→ξi(K) = `, the
above equation delivers:
γi =
Du
(
w()`
)
+ γiDv
(
w()`
)
Dv
(
w()`
) ,
that is impossible (a contradiction), whence ` = +∞. Q.E.D
V.6 Proof of Proposition III.4
Proof: (i) For a constrained individual i, it is convenient to extend the function ξi(K) over
the interval [ ˇKi,+∞[ with ξi(K) = − λ. The existence of an equilibrium is hence ensured
by the one of a value of K such that:
F(K, )− ηK =
n∑
i=
ξi(K)DLF(K, )
n
,
hence, making use of the Euler relationship,
DKF(K, )K− ηK
DLF(K, )
=

n
n∑
i=
[
ξi(K)− ].
or H`(K) = Hr(K). First and for K→ , H`(K) < Hr(K). Indeed, whilst H`(K) is bounded
under Assumption T.2, it is obtained that Hr(K) → ∞ as a direct corollary of Lemma
III.3(ii).
Now, for K such that:
K = ˇK > ˇK > · · · > ˇKn,
ξi(K) = −λ for any i = , . . . , n and Hr( ˇK) = −λ. Further, DKF( ˇK, ) ˇK−ηˇK >  since
ˇK < ˆK, for ˆK that satisfies DKF( ˆK, ) = η. This implies H
`
(
ˇK) > H
r
(
ˇK). The existence
of a K ∈ ], ˇK[ such that H`(K) = Hr(K) is established. Q.E.D
V.7 Proof of Lemma IV.2
Proof: The consumer program writes down along:
max
{cit}
+∞∑
t=
(
δi
)t{
u
(
cit
)
+ γi
[
v
(
cit
)− v(ci∗t )]}
s.t ait+ = Rtait + wt − cit,
limt→+∞ait
/ t∏
τ=
Rτ > ,
cit 6 ci∗t , ai given.
The optimality conditions are obtained by first listing the Lagrangian:
Lt =
(
δi
)t{
u
(
cit
)
+ γi
[
v
(
cit
)− v(ci∗t )]}+ μit+[Rtait + wt − cit]− μitait + νit(ci∗t − cit),
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Whence:(
δi
)t[Du(cit)+ γiDv(cit)] = μit+ + νit,
μit+ = Rtμit,
limt→+∞μitait = .
In parallel to this, the optimal behaviour of the competitive firm delivers the equilibrium val-
ues of the real wage rate and of the rental rate for the capital stock along wt = DLF(Kt, )/n
and Rt = DKF(Kt, ) +−η. The equilibrium on the capital market being finally associated
with the holding of ∑ni= ait = Kt for any t > , the characterisation follows. Q.E.D
V.8 Proof of Proposition IV.3
Proof: The argument derives by proving that the sequence {ci∗t ,K
∗
t }, i = , . . . , n, satisfies
the whole set of conditions that characterise a competitive equilibrium with constraints upon
consumption for appropriately chosen values of μit and νit and for a fitting distribution of the
initial wealths ai. Letting μit+ = χt+/ζi and νit = (δi)tγiDv(cit). Defining then the prices
of the factors according to w∗t = DLF(K
∗
t , )/n and R
∗
t = DKF(K
∗
t , ) +  − η, the initial
wealths of the agents are selected so as to satisfy:
ai =
+∞∑
t=
ci∗t∏t
τ= R
∗
τ
−
+∞∑
t=
w∗t∏t
τ= R
∗
τ
,
that is possible since
n∑
i=
ai =
+∞∑
t=
∑n
i= c
i∗
t − nw∗t
Πtτ=R
∗
τ
=
+∞∑
t=
F
(
K∗t , 
)
−K∗t+ + (− η)K
∗
t − FL
(
K∗t , 
)
Πtτ=R
∗
τ
=
+∞∑
t=
R∗tK
∗
t −K
∗
t+
Πtτ=R
∗
τ
= K∗.
The sequence
{
ait
}
is then recursively defined through
ait+ = Rtait + wt − ci∗t .
Finally, and by the definition of ai, one obtains:
limt→+∞ait
/ t∏
τ=
Rτ = ,
that establishes Proposition IV.3. Q.E.D.
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